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Irrespective of whether discretion or commitment to a binding rule guides the conduct of 
monetary policy, the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve causes the 
behavior of the key economic variables in the open economy to be dramatically different from that in 
the closed economy. In the open economy, the policymaker can no longer perfectly stabilize real 
output and the rate of inflation in the face of IS and UIP shocks as well as shocks to foreign 
inflation. If the exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve is operative, then in the open economy 
the policymaker faces an output-inflation tradeoff that differs substantially from its counterpart in 
the closed economy.  
Our analysis of the conduct of monetary policy reveals that the stabilization bias under 
discretion is weaker in the open economy relative to the closed economy. In the open economy, a 
“less conservative central banker”, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in 
the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behavior of real output that eventuates under 
optimal policy. 
Evaluating the social loss function under discretion and commitment, we find that the 
existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve mitigates the pronounced 
differences between the two strategies that exist in case of high persistence in the stochastic shocks. 
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I. Introduction 
  In the open economy the exchange rate is an important factor in the design of monetary 
policy. The nominal exchange rate may serve as the underlying objective of monetary policy in the 
short-to-medium term in its capacity as an intermediate target. The real exchange rate is of concern 
to policymakers not least because of its importance in determining the competitiveness of domestic 
goods in global markets. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) emphasize the role of the real exchange 
rate as the driving force behind the expenditure switching effect in their open economy model. Their 
model is by-and-large an extension of the closed-economy New Keynesian framework to the open 
economy, albeit one that allows only a circumscribed role for the real exchange rate in the 
transmission of monetary policy effects.
1 That the real exchange rate can play a much more 
pervasive role has recently been documented by Ball (1999), Froyen and Guender (2000), Guender 
(2001), McCallum and Nelson (1999), Svensson (2000), and Walsh (1999).
2,3 All of these 
contributions share the common characteristic that the real exchange rate directly affects behavior on 
the production side of the economy.
4 
This paper underscores the importance of the direct exchange rate channel in the 
transmission of monetary policy effects in the open economy. We show that the stabilizing 
properties of discretionary and optimal policymaking in the face of demand-side disturbances 
diminish dramatically if this direct exchange rate channel is present in the Phillips Curve. In 
addition, we illustrate that the optimal relationship that characterizes real output and the rate of 
inflation in the open economy depends on all structural parameters of the model and the 
policymaker’s preferences. Persistence in the stochastic disturbances figures also in the 
determination of the optimality condition under commitment. Our analysis also reveals that the 
output-inflation tradeoff is more favorable under commitment than under discretion in part because 
                                                 
1  For a detailed exposition of the closed economy New Keynesian framework, see their survey article (1999). 
2  This list is by no means exhaustive. Early contributions that highlight the real exchange rate effects on aggregate 
supply are by Marston (1985) and Turnovsky (1983).  
3  While writing this paper, I became aware of the existence of an unpublished paper by Walsh (1999). He examines the 
conduct of monetary policy in the open economy from a similar perspective after extending Calvo’s (1983) staggered 
price setting model to the open economy. 
4  Employing a backward-looking framework, Ball (1999) motivates the direct real exchange rate effect on the rate of 
inflation by assuming that foreign producers care only about goods prices expressed in their home currency. 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Froyen and Guender (2000) assume that a foreign resource input enters as an 
intermediate input in production. Guender (2001) extends Rotemberg’s (1982) sticky price model to the open economy 
where domestic producers take their optimal price to be equal to the domestic currency price of the competing foreign 
good. Walsh (1999) introduces a real exchange rate channel by assuming that real wage demands are based on the 
CPI.   2
of the existence of the direct exchange rate channel. Moreover, the stabilization bias inherent in 
discretionary policymaking is found to be lower in our open economy framework relative to the 
standard closed economy framework. As a consequence, a less “conservative central banker” can be 
entrusted with the task of running the central bank. Towards the end of the paper, we investigate the 
effects of varying the degree of persistence in the stochastic disturbances and the size of the direct 
exchange rate effect in the Phillips Curve on the attractiveness of discretionary policymaking versus 
commitment. High persistence in the stochastic shocks combined with a weak or non-existent direct 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve detract from the appeal of conducting monetary policy 
with discretion. 
  The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II.A we lay out the building blocks of 
the model while in Section II.B we present a brief description of the policymaker’s preferences. 
Section III and Section IV analyze the conduct of monetary policy under discretion and 
commitment. The issue of appointing a conservative central banker is taken up in Section V. In 
Section VI we parameterize the model to evaluate the performance of policymaking under discretion 
and commitment. This exercise relies on a numerical evaluation of loss functions. Concluding 
remarks appear in Section VII.  
  
II.A.   The Model. 
This section presents a model of a small open economy. Three equations make up the model. 
All variables with the exception of the nominal interest rate are expressed in logarithms. All 
parameters are positive. 
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where: 
t y  = the real output gap. 
t   = domestic rate of inflation at time t measured as  1   t t p p .  
1  t t E   = the expectation of  1  t   formed at time t. 
f
t t E 1   = the expectation formed at time t of the foreign rate of inflation for period t+1  3
t R  = the domestic nominal interest rate at time t. 
f
t R = the foreign nominal interest rate at time t. 
t q = the real exchange rate defined as  t
f
t t p p s    where  t s is the nominal exchange rate (domestic 
currency per unit of foreign currency), 
f
t p is the foreign price level, and  t p  is the domestic price 
level.  
1  t tq E = the expectation dated t of the real exchange rate for period t+1. 
t u , t v , and t   are stochastic disturbances. 
 
  The first two relations incorporate the forward-looking behavior typical of the New 
Keynesian framework. Equation (1) represents the forward-looking Phillips curve relation for the 
open economy. In this economy real output is produced by monopolistically competitive firms. 
These firms set the price of output in order to minimize a cost function that takes into account the 
existence of menu costs and the cost of charging a price different from the optimal price. Apart from 
the standard excess demand effect, the open economy Phillips Curve also features a direct real 
exchange rate effect on domestic inflation.
5 Equation (2) defines an open economy IS relation - 
output demanded depends on the expected real interest rate and the real exchange rate.
6 Equation (3) 
is the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP), expressed in real terms, where t   can be thought 
of as a time-varying risk premium.
  
 
                                                 
5 The rationale behind this is that a depreciation causes the domestic currency price of the foreign good, ( t
f
t s p  ), to 
increase. The increase in the exchange rate forces up the optimal price, which, ceteris paribus, induces firms to raise 
the price of their output so as to minimize the deviation between the optimal price and the actual price charged. At the 
aggregate level the increase in the domestic price level causes the rate of inflation to rise. Thus we observe the positive 
link between the exchange rate and the rate of inflation. For a complete derivation of the open economy Phillips 
Curve, see Guender (2001).  
6 This is a simplified version of the IS relation for the open economy in McCallum and Nelson (1997) or Guender (2001) 
that is derived from first principles. The IS relation presented in Guender (2001) differs from the one above in that the 
expectation of the real exchange rate for period t+1, the current foreign output gap as well as the expectation of the 
foreign output gap for period t+1 enter. The simplified IS relation suffices for the purpose of the current paper. There 
is no LM relation as the policymaker uses the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument.  
  4
II.B.   The Preferences of the Policymaker. 
  The policymaker’s preferences extend over the variability of the real output gap and the 
domestic rate of inflation, respectively. The explicit objective function that he attempts to minimize 
is given by  
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Equation (4) implies that the policymaker’s sole concern rests with real output and inflation 
variability. Fluctuations in the real exchange rate do not enter explicitly the loss function. The reason 
for the omission is that changes in the real exchange rate are reflected in changes in the output gap.
7,8 
 
III.   Policy Making Under Discretion. 
  To set the stage for illustrating how discretionary policymaking in the open economy is 
carried out, it is helpful at the outset to reduce the dimension of the optimization problem to one 
involving only one constraint. A few simple steps need to be taken. First, we solve the UIP condition 
for the real exchange rate and substitute it into both the IS equation and the Phillips curve relation. 
Next, we solve the IS relation for the expected real rate of interest ( 1   t t t E R  ). Following this, we 
insert the expression for expected real rate of interest into the Phillips curve relation. The following 
expression results: 
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When setting policy with discretion, the policymaker takes the expectations of the 
endogenous variables  t t t q y , ,  and the remaining terms as given.
9 Hence we can rewrite the above 
as 
                                                 
7 This is evident once the UIP condition is solved for Rt and the resulting expression is inserted into the IS curve. For a 
similar view on why the loss function contains only real output and the domestic rate of inflation, see Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler (2001). Adopting equation (4) as the welfare criterion ignores the effects on welfare of changes in the real 
exchange rate in the open economy framework.  
8 The target level for real output is the trend level of output. The target rate for the rate of inflation is assumed to be zero. 
Woodford (1999a) derives an endogenous loss function based on the utility-maximizing framework. According to this 
analysis, the policymaker ought to be concerned with the variability of the output gap (and not the level of output) and 
the stability in the general price level.   5
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Notice further that the objective function can be neatly broken up into two separate 
components as future values of the endogenous variables are independent of today’s policy action:
10 
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  The problem of setting policy under discretion thus reduces to the following simple one-
period optimization problem: 
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Combining the first-order conditions produces a systematic negative relationship between real output 
and the rate of inflation: 
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9 Here we adopt the convention of describing the conduct of discretionary policy along the lines of Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (1999).  
10 Future values of yt and t are not affected by policy today as the effect of policy is contemporaneous and the absence 
of persistence in the endogenous variables.  6
The coefficient on the rate of inflation indicates the loss of output that the policymaker is prepared to 
sustain if the rate of inflation exceeds its zero target level. 
  There are several noteworthy facts about the systematic relationship between real output and 
the rate of inflation under discretion: 
a.  If the direct exchange rate channel is absent from the Phillips Curve, i.e. if b=0, then the optimal 
relationship between real output and the rate of inflation is the same for both the open and the 
closed economy framework. In this case, the coefficient on  t  reduces to  a   . If  0  b , then the 
optimality condition depends on all parameters of the model, and not only on the parameter on 
excess demand in the Phillips curve.  
b.  As long as  0  b  the coefficient on the rate of inflation is greater in the open economy than in 
the closed economy since a
a a
b





c.  The greater the size of the two Phillips curve parameters,aand b , the greater the sacrifice in 
terms of real output that must be made when the rate of inflation exceeds its target. Conversely, 
the more sensitive real output responds to the exchange rate and the real rate of interest (i.e. the 
greater  1 a and  2 a ), the less real output must decrease in case inflation exceeds its target level. 
Clearly, greater aversion to deviations of the rate of inflation from target (increasing ) also 
increases the coefficient on  t  . 
d.  In the closed economy, the inverse relationship between real output and inflation depends 
critically on the existence of cost-push shocks. In the present open economy framework, this 
inverse relationship also exists if the excess demand channel is shut off (i.e. in case  0  a . 
Moreover, real output and inflation are inversely related under discretionary policy even in the 
wake of a demand shock. Suppose  0  t v . Real output increases along with the real rate of 
interest. The increase in the real rate of interest causes the exchange rate to appreciate which in 
turn causes the rate of inflation to decrease. Thus real output and the rate of inflation move in 
opposite directions. 
 
To obtain the reduced form equations for the endogenous variables, we combine the 
optimality condition, Equation (9), with Equation (5). As expectations are formed rationally, we 
pose putative solutions of the endogenous variables. We can show that the two endogenous variables  7
of interest, the rate of inflation and the output gap, reduce to the expressions that appear in Table 1. 
The results presented underscore a critical difference between the open- and the closed-economy 
framework.
11 While in the closed economy framework the rate of inflation and the output gap 
respond only to the cost-push disturbance, the two endogenous variables respond to all disturbances 
of the model in the open economy. Demand-side disturbances – foreign or domestic - can no longer 
be perfectly stabilized because of the existence of the direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
Curve. Any change in the real rate of interest in the wake of a demand disturbance prompts a change 
in the real exchange rate that directly affects the rate of inflation. The importance of the direct 
exchange rate channel depends on the size of the structural parameter b. Setting b to zero restores the 
perfect stabilization property of monetary policy in the face of demand-side disturbances. 
 
IV. Policymaking Under Commitment. 
 
Commitment implies that the policymaker follows a rule systematically. In view of the fact 
that the policymaker cares about deviations of inflation from target and deviations of the real output 
gap from its target level, the policy rule focuses on the two target variables.
12 The policy rule takes a 
simple linear form: 
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  One critical difference that sets policy under commitment apart from policy under discretion 
pertains to the role of expectations in the model. Under discretion, the policymaker acts on the basis 
of fixed or given expectations as he is unable to manipulate them systematically. In contrast, under 
commitment, expectations about future values of the rate of inflation, real output, and the real 
exchange rate are endemic to the system. Indeed, the temporal properties of the stochastic 
                                                 
11 Throughout the analysis the coefficient on 
f
t r is identical to that on  t  . For the sake of brevity, we report only the 
latter.  
12 Here we will abstract from the notion of conducting monetary policy from a timeless perspective as discussed by 
Woodford (1999b) and McCallum and Nelson (2000).  8
disturbances that impinge upon the economy are very important in determining these expectations. 
All shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
13 
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To proceed, we combine Equation (10) with the IS relation, the Phillips Curve, and the UIP 
condition. To solve out the expectations of the future rate of inflation, real output, and the real 
exchange rate, we posit putative solutions for the three endogenous variables in line with the 
minimum state variable approach suggested by McCallum (1983). The solution for  t y  appears in 
Table 2. It is apparent that the coefficients on the stochastic disturbances depend on the parameters 
of the model, the policy parameter , and the autoregressive parameter  . 
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The next step consists of substituting the reduced form equation for  t y  into the objective function. 
Under commitment the policymaker chooses the policy parameter  so as to minimize the objective 
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13 To simplify things, we assume that the autoregressive parameter is the same for each disturbance. Imposing this 
condition has the advantage of allowing us to derive an analytical solution to the problem of determining optimal 
policy under commitment. 















, an expression that does not contain the policy parameter  .  
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Substituting Equation (13) back into Equation (10) and rearranging it slightly yields: 
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Equation (14) describes the systematic relationship between real output and the rate of 
inflation in the open economy under commitment.
15 In addition, Table 3 shows how the rate of 
inflation and real output, respectively,
 responds to the stochastic disturbances of the model under 
commitment. In the paragraphs to follow, we shall attempt to highlight the he essential differences 
between policymaking under discretion as opposed to commitment. 
The first critical difference pertains to the size of the coefficient on the rate of inflation in the 
optimality conditions. The coefficient on the rate of inflation is greater under commitment (Equation 
(14)) than discretion (Equation (9)) for  > 0.
16 To see how the improved tradeoff between inflation 
and real output comes about, we have to reconsider the Phillips Curve for the open economy. 
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15 The points made earlier about the properties of the optimality condition under discretion in the open as opposed to the 
closed economy also apply with minor modifications under commitment. For instance, if the exchange rate channel is 







16 Thus for the output-inflation tradeoff to be different under commitment relative to discretion it is necessary for the 
disturbances to be autorcorrelated.   10
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The above reduces to: 
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Equation (1d) in turn can be rewritten as: 
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Equation (1e) illustrates the relationship between the rate of inflation, real output, and the 
real exchange rate under commitment. According to this equation, a decrease in the output gap and 
an appreciation of the exchange rate are accompanied by a decrease in the rate of inflation. It is 
instructive to compare the coefficients on the right-hand side of Equation (1e) to their counterparts 
under discretion: 
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It becomes immediately apparent that the size of the coefficients on real output and the real 
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The more sensitive response of the rate of inflation under commitment is a direct 
consequence of the effect of the policy rule on the expectations of the future evolution of both real 
output and the real exchange rate.  
The second critical difference between policymaking under commitment as opposed to 
discretion follows directly from the improved output-inflation tradeoff and pertains to the size of the 
coefficients on the disturbances in the equations for t and yt. Inspection of the coefficients in Tables 
1 and 3 reveals that the rate of inflation is less responsive to shocks under commitment than under 
discretion. While the numerator of each coefficient is the same for both strategies, the denominator 
is clearly greater in size under commitment, i.e. C>D. In contrast, real output is more sensitive to 
shocks under commitment than under discretion.
17 Thus inflation is closer to target under 
commitment while the output gap is smaller under discretion. Hence there is a bias towards 
stabilizing real output under discretion. But how serious is the stabilization bias in the open as 
opposed to the closed economy? To provide a partial answer to this question, let us compare the 
response of real output to a cost-push shock in both frameworks.
18 Figure 1 underscores the 
importance of the real exchange rate channel in reducing the size of the stabilization bias in the open 
economy. In the case where b = 0, which also corresponds to the closed economy framework, the 
stabilization bias is not only much greater in size but is also more sensitive to the degree of 
persistence in the stochastic disturbances than in the open economy. As b increases in steps of 0.25 
the stabilization bias becomes ever smaller. Irrespective of the size of b, the stabilization bias first 
rises and then drops off as the degree of persistence in the stochastic disturbances increases. 
Taken altogether, the results reported in this section can be summarized as follows. First, the 
optimal policy parameter in the open economy differs substantially from its counterpart in the closed 
economy due to the existence of a direct exchange rate channel. Second, the findings suggest that in 
the open economy the responses of real output and inflation to stochastic disturbances – though more 
complex and different in size - follow the same pattern under commitment and discretion as in the 
                                                 
17 The appendix provides a detailed explanation of this result. 
18 The comparison focuses on the cost-push disturbance, as it is the only disturbance that affects real output in the closed 
economy.  12
closed economy.
19 Third, the stabilization bias is smaller in the open compared to the closed 
economy framework. 
 
V.   On the Issue of the Conservative Central Banker. 
The closed-economy analysis by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) contains an intriguing 
result. They argue that that the rationale for appointing a conservative central banker of the Rogoff 
(1985) type also holds in a closed economy framework that fits the New Keynesian mold. Indeed, 
the appointment of a banker who attaches a greater weight to inflation variability than society in the 
objective function and carries out policy with discretion results in outcomes for inflation and real 
output that are identical to those under commitment.  
 In the closed economy, the optimality condition under discretion and commitment are given 
by: 
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* , and the policymaker carries out 
policy with discretion, he will deliver the same solutions for real output and the rate of inflation as 
under commitment.
  
  This result does not, however, carry over to the open economy framework where the direct 
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve is operative. This can easily be seen by comparing the 
optimality conditons under commitment and discretion: 
   Discretion   Commitment 
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Appointing a conservative central banker, one who has a greater aversion to inflation variability 
(replacing  with 
* and vesting him with discretion, will not suffice to deliver the same output-
                                                 
19 It should be borne in mind, however, that the autoregressive parameter  has a far more important role to play in the 
open economy than in the closed economy. This is made evident by 1- being attached not only to the preference 
parameter of the policymaker but also to structural parameters such as b and a1.  13
inflation tradeoff (or induce the same behavior for real output and inflation) as prevails under 
commitment.  
Nevertheless it is possible to induce real output and the rate of inflation to mimic their 
behavior under commitment if a conservative banker with the appropriate dislike for inflation 
variability is chosen. This weight is given by:
20 
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As the numerator of the expression within brackets is smaller than the denominator in Equation (18) 
it follows further that: 
 
*     
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Thus, compared to the closed economy, in the open economy, a “less conservative” central banker 
vested with discretion would do to replicate the behavior of real output and the rate of inflation that 
prevails under commitment. The existence of the direct exchange rate effect on the rate of inflation 
in the forward-looking Phillips Curve accounts for the smaller weight on the variance of the rate of 
inflation in the loss function. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that there is upward pressure 
on inflation as a result of a cost-push shock or demand-side disturbance. The monetary tightening in 
response to the inflationary pressure causes the exchange rate to appreciate. This in turn has an 
immediate mitigating effect on the rate of inflation that complements the indirect effect that the 
output gap exerts on inflation through the combined interest rate and exchange rate channels. With 
monetary policy being able to influence the rate of inflation through the exchange rate, the 
                                                 
20 To obtain this result, simply equate the output-inflation tradeoffs under discretion and commitment and solve for 
CB  . Alternatively, set the denominators of the coefficients of the rate of inflation (or output) on a given shock under 
both policy regimes equal to each other and solve for
CB  .  14
policymaker can afford to accord a smaller weight to the variance of the rate of inflation in the loss 
function. 
 
VI.   The Monetary Policy Strategies in Perspective.  
  In this section we intend to compare and contrast policy making under discretion and 
commitment from a somewhat different angle. The role of a “conservative central banker will also 
be briefly touched on. Our primary objective is to examine the merits of discretion vis-à-vis 
commitment on the basis of a numerical evaluation of the social loss function. Two parameters,  
and b, play a key role in this comparison. The degree of autocorrelation in the disturbances features 
because it affects the optimality condition under commitment but not under discretion. The 
sensitivity of inflation to the real exchange rate in the Phillips Curve is accorded a prominent role 
because it is instrumental in shaping the optimizing behavior of the policymaker in the open 
economy. In addition, we also investigate the behavior of the constituent parts of the loss function, 
i.e. we take a close look at the behavior of the variance of the rate of inflation and the variance of 
real output in isolation under either strategy of monetary policy.  
Table 4 provides summary information about the numerical values of the loss functions and 
the respective variances under discretion (Dis), commitment (Com), and the case of a “conservative 
central banker “(CB). Inspection of the contents of Table 4 yields several noteworthy observations. 
First, autocorrelation in the disturbances is necessary to generate differences in social welfare. In 
case of white noise disturbances the three loss functions are equal. Second, commitment is welfare-
improving vis-à-vis discretion for  99 . 0 0   as indicated by the lower score of the loss function 
under commitment. Third, losses under discretion and commitment are increasing in the degree of 
persistence in the stochastic disturbances. Fourth, in the absence of firm commitment to optimal 
policy, the appointment of a “conservative central banker” can successfully replicate the outcome 
under commitment as the entries of columns two and three are identical. The weight 
CB that the 
“conservative central banker” must attach to the variance of inflation in his loss function is an 
increasing function of the degree of persistence of the stochastic disturbances. The weights 
corresponding to the different values of  appear in the last column of the table. Finally, turning 
attention to the size of fluctuations of the rate of inflation and real output, we find that under 
discretion the ratio of the variance of the rate of inflation to that of real output is not only greater 
than its counterpart under commitment (for  > 0) but also immune to the degree of autocorrelation  15
in the disturbances.
21 Dividing column six by column five, we find this value to be constant at 2.98. 
In marked contrast, we find the ratio of the variance of the rate of inflation to the variance of real 
output to be extremely sensitive to the degree of autorcorrelation under commitment. The difference 
in the two ratios is evident in Figure 2. Under commitment the ratio in question declines from a 
maximum value of 2.98 to a minimum value that is close to zero while the horizontal line marks the 
constant value of the ratio under discretion.
22  
  Figure 3 shows how the ratio of loss functions, LossDis/LossCom, changes as the degree of 
persistence in the disturbances changes. Each of the five relative loss functions is based on a 
different value for b. All relative loss functions are rather flat and tightly bunched around one for 
low values of , but they increase steadily and drift apart for  > 0.5. This result implies that marked 
differences between policymaking under commitment as opposed to discretion arise only if there is a 
rather high degree of autocorrelation in the disturbances and no pronounced response of the rate of 
inflation to the real exchange rate in the Phillips Curve. It is apparent that relative losses are most 
pronounced if b=0 and  tends towards maximum persistence (0.99). For rather high values of , 
relative losses are much smaller if a potent exchange rate channel is operative in the Phillips Curve 
(b=1). Closer inspection of Figure 3 also reveals that for medium-size values of  the magnitude of 
relative losses does not necessarily move in lock-step with the size of b. For instance, for  < 0.6 
relative losses based on b=0.25 and indicated by the dotted curve exceed those associated with b=0, 
represented by the solid curve.  
Precise calculations of the relative loss functions appear in Table 5A. Any entry greater than 
one implies that the losses under discretion exceed those under commitment. Taking each column in 
isolation, we observe that relative losses increase in line with the degree of serial correlation. Taking 
each row in isolation, we confirm the finding made by visual inspection of Figure 3 that relative 
losses do not necessarily decrease as the effect of the direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
                                                 
21 Recall that under discretion the autoregressive parameter appears only in the denominator of the coefficients in the 
reduced form equation. But the denominators cancel in the process of calculating the ratio of the variances, thus 
accounting for the absence of a relationship between the variances of real output and inflation under discretion and the 
size of . 
22 Here a slight anomaly ought to be pointed out. Closer inspection of Table 4, in particular columns 8 and 10 reveals 
that for extremely high values of  like 0.99 the variance of inflation is actually less than for smaller values of . This 
is clearly attributable to the particular parameter values chosen for the purpose of the comparisons. If the current 
parameter values are replaced with those chosen by Leitemo et al. (2002), the variance of inflation under commitment 
increases throughout as  increases. Nevertheless, the essential characteristic of Figure 2, the downward sloping curve, 
also materializes in this alternative scenario. 
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Curve increases. Moving from left to right, we find that for  =0.1 and  =0.2 relative losses reach 
their maximum if b = 0.5 while for  6 . 0 3 . 0   relative losses reach their maximum if b = 0.25. 
Notice that in the presence of positive persistence in the stochastic disturbances, both the minimum 
and the maximum value of the relative loss function obtain in the absence of a direct exchange rate 
effect in the Phillips Curve. 
In Table 5B we tabulate ratios of the relative loss functions. There are four different ratios. 
Each ratio has the same denominator - the case where the relative loss function corresponds to b = 0 
- but a different numerator that depends on a given, strictly positive value for b. Examining each of 
the four columns, we observe a relationship between the ratios of the relative loss function and  that 
is initially positive before reaching a maximum and thereafter declining. The boldface numbers in 
the table represent the maximum values of the respective ratio. Notice that the size of the maximum 
ratio declines as the size of b increases. There is a clearly recognizable step-function like pattern in 












Taken altogether, in an economy that features a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips 
Curve, the difference between policymaking under discretion and commitment – as measured by the 
relative social loss function is rather stark. Social losses are greater under discretion especially if 
there is a large degree of persistence in the stochastic disturbances. The losses mount under 
discretion because the policymaker ignores the persistence property of the stochastic disturbances, 
which conveys important information about the future behavior of the endogenous variables, when 
carrying out the optimization exercise every period.  
 
VII.   Conclusion. 
  The main conclusion that the present paper offers is that the conduct of stabilization policy in 
the open economy can - but need not - differ markedly from that in the closed economy. Likewise, 
the inverse optimal relationship between real output and the rate of inflation in the open economy 
can - but need not – take a different shape from the one that prevails in the closed economy. The 
difference lies in the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve.  
                                                 
23 Ratios that are greater than one appear in italics. 
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Irrespective of whether discretion or commitment to a binding rule guides the conduct of 
monetary policy, the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve causes the 
behavior of the key economic variables in the open economy to be dramatically different from that in 
the closed economy. In the open economy, the policymaker can no longer perfectly stabilize real 
output and the rate of inflation in the face of IS and UIP shocks as well as shocks to foreign 
inflation. If the exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve is operative, then in the open economy 
the policymaker faces an output-inflation tradeoff that differs substantially from its counterpart in 
the closed economy. These findings stand in sharp contrast with the claim that monetary policy in 
the open economy is isomorphic to the case of monetary policy in the closed economy as recently 
stated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). 
Our analysis of the conduct of monetary policy reveals that the stabilization bias under 
discretion is weaker in the open economy relative to the closed economy. In the open economy, a 
“less conservative central banker”, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in 
the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behavior of real output that eventuates under 
optimal policy. 
Scrutinizing the social loss functions under discretion and commitment, we find that 
pronounced differences between the two strategies exist in case of high persistence in the stochastic 
shocks coupled with a weak or non-existent direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve.  18
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The Responses of the Rate of Inflation and the Output Gap to the Disturbances of the Model: The Case of Discretion. 
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TABLE 2: The Reduced Form Equation for Real Output. 
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Note: Substituting the equation for yt  into the policy rule yields the  
reduced form equation for the rate of inflation: t t y     . 
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TABLE 3: 
Responses of the Rate of Inflation and the Output Gap to the Disturbances of the Model: The Case of Commitment. 
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TABLE 4: The Loss Functions and the Variances of the Rate of Inflation and Real Output. 
 
 
LossDis  LossCom  LossCB    V(y)Dis  V()Dis  V(y)Com  V()Com  V(y)CB  V()CB  CB 
0,212435  0,212435  0,212435  0 0,053934  0,158501  0,053934  0,158501  0,053934  0,158501  1 
0,258051  0,257686  0,257686  0,1 0,065516  0,192536  0,074034  0,183652  0,074034  0,183652  1,088 
0,326993  0,324868  0,324868  0,2 0,083019  0,243974  0,106244  0,218623  0,106244  0,218623  1,195 
0,435529  0,428155  0,428155  0,3 0,110575  0,324954  0,160354  0,267801  0,160354  0,267801  1,327 
0,616945  0,595258  0,595258  0,4 0,156634  0,460311  0,256853  0,338405  0,256853  0,338405  1,494 
0,946734  0,885417  0,885417  0,5 0,240362  0,706371  0,442708  0,442708  0,442708  0,442708  1,714 
1,62208  1,441746  1,441746  0,6 0,411823  1,210256  0,83944  0,602306  0,83944  0,602306  2,024 
3,274021  2,675869  2,675869  0,7 0,831228  2,442793  1,820066  0,855803  1,820066  0,855803  2,500 
8,688688  6,144074  6,144074  0,8 2,205936  6,482751  4,87945  1,264624  4,87945  1,264624  3,367 
40,85878  21,82294  21,82294  0,9 10,37347  30,48531  20,02105  1,801894  20,02105  1,801894  5,714 
1572,193  452,9007  452,9007  0,99 399,1579  1173,035  452,2307  0,669991  452,2307  0,669991  44,538 
 
Notes:  
a.  It is conventional practice to assume that the discount factor in the loss function approaches unity. Following this convention allows us to replace the 
standard loss  
function 
2 2
t t y    with the unconditional variances of  real output and the rate of inflation. Hence the social loss function is given by: 
). ( ) ( t t V y V Loss       
In calculating LossDis, LossCom, and LossCB, we let  . 1    
b.  The parameter values and the variances of the disturbances upon which the calculations are based are: 
25 . 0 ; 25 . 0 ; 5 . 0
2 2 2 2
2 1         f u v b a a a        
Other constellations of parameter values were tried as well. However, they do not affect the results in any meaningful way. For instance, taking the values of 
the parameters from the study by Leitemo, Roisland and Torvik (2002) produces merely greater numerical values for the loss functions (even though they 
consider essentially a backward-looking framework, some characteristics of which are incongruent with those of the forward-looking framework). 
 See footnote 23 of the text for a minor difference concerning the behavior of the rate of inflation under commitment.   
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TABLE 5A:   The Size of the Relative Loss Functions. 
 
  b=0 b=0,25  b=0,5  b=0,75 b=1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
0,1  1,000675 1,001417 1,001559 1,001364 1,001104 
0,2  1,003361 1,006543 1,006869 1,005832 1,004636 
0,3  1,009675 1,017223 1,017143 1,014088 1,010976 
0,4  1,022784 1,036433 1,034102 1,027033 1,020607 
0,5  1,049383 1,069252 1,060326 1,045918 1,034178 
0,6 1,105186  1,12508  1,09999  1,072653  1,052652 
0,7  1,233056 1,223536 1,160765 1,110584 1,077708 
0,8  1,580499 1,414157 1,260003 1,167165 1,113148 
0,9  2,91716 1,872286 1,45475 1,267539  1,172388 
0,95  5,45679 2,434282  1,662599 1,36927 1,231015 
0,99  12,65398 3,471386 2,025837 1,551958 1,341341 
 
Note: An entry greater than one implies that the losses under discretion exceed those 








































0 1 1 1 1 
0,1  1,000742 1,000884 1,000689 1,000429 
0,2  1,003172 1,003497 1,002463 1,001271 
0,3  1,007476 1,007396 1,004371 1,001289 
0,4  1,013345  1,011066  1,004154  0,997872 
0,5  1,018934  1,010429  0,996699 0,985511 
0,6  1,018001  0,995299 0,970563 0,952466 
0,7  0,992279 0,941372 0,900676 0,874014 
0,8  0,894754 0,797219 0,738479 0,704302 
0,9  0,641818 0,498687 0,434511 0,401894 
0,95  0,446101  0,304685 0,25093 0,225593 























where x=0,25, 0,5, 0,75, 1.  25













































































































































The purpose of the appendix is to provide a detailed explanation of how some of the results 
presented in the main part of the paper were established.24 
 
 




To determine the response of the rate of inflation to cost-push and IS disturbances under 
commitment relative to discretion, we merely have to compare the denominators of the coefficients 
of the two shocks.25 That is because the numerators of the coefficients are the same:  2 1 ) 1 ( a a    
for the cost-push disturbance and b  for the IS disturbance.  
In what follows below, we break up the denominator into two parts. Doing so brings out the 
importance of the direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve. 
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Comparing the first term, we find that: 
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For the second term we find that:  
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Taken altogether, these results imply that the denominator under commitment is greater than the 
denominator under discretion. In view of the fact that the numerators are equal, this implies further 
that the rate of inflation is less responsive to both cost-push shocks and IS disturbances if the 
policymaker is bound by commitment to a rule.  
                                                 
24 The reader is referred to the results contained in Tables 1 and 2 of the main part of the paper. 
25 Notice that UIP and foreign inflation shocks are multiples of the IS shock.  28
A.2. Real Output 
 
We invoke a similar procedure to determine the response of real output to cost-push and IS 
disturbances under commitment and discretion. Notice thought that the present comparison is 
somewhat more complicated as now both the numerators and the denominators of the coefficients on 
the disturbances for both strategies are different. To facilitate the comparison of the responses under 
the two competing strategies, we take the following step. We make the numerators of both 
coefficients equal by dividing the numerators and the denominators of the coefficients on both 
disturbances by the respective numerator. The resulting expressions thus differ only by the size of 
their denominators and appear in the table below. 
 
 
A.2.1.Cost Push Disturbance: 
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Each denominator comprises three terms. They have the following characteristics: 
 
i.  the second terms are equal. 
ii.  it is straightforward to establish that for the third term in the denominators:  
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iii.   nothing definite can be said about the first term in the denominators as:          
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        Both the numerator and denominator of the first term are smaller under commitment relative to 
discretion. As a consequence, it is impossible to show analytically whether the size of the coefficient 
on the cost-push shock is greater under commitment than under discretion. In view of this ambiguity, 
we need to draw on values for the structural coefficients and the autoregressive parameter   in order 
to establish the size of the coefficients. Figure A1 illustrates how the size of the coefficients on the 
cost-push disturbance in the output equation – as they appear in the above table - varies as the degree 
of persistence in the disturbances increases from zero to 0.99. The response of real output to a cost-
push disturbance is unambiguously greater under commitment than under discretion for all values of 
 > 0.26   
 
 
A.2.2. IS Disturbance 
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Again each denominator comprises three terms. And once again, we encounter a difficulty in 
determining analytically whether the size of the coefficient on the IS disturbance is greater under 
commitment than under discretion.  
 
i.  the second terms are equal. 
ii.  it is straightforward to establish that for the third term in the denominators: 
 
                                                 
26 Figures A1 and A2 are based on the following parameter values:  1 ; 25 . 0 , 5 . 0 2 1       a b a a . Other parameter 
values were tried as well but in every case the response of output under commitment exceeded the response under 
discretion.   30



























iii.   nothing definite can be said about the first term in the denominators as:          
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2 2 2 1 ) 1 ( a a        and 
 


















To get around this problem, we again assign numerical values to the parameters of the model. Figure 
A2 depicts the relationship between the size of the coefficient on the IS shock in the output equation 
under the two policy regimes. Once again for  > 0 the response of real output to an IS shock is 
greater under commitment than under discretion. 
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